

bond, before a better constitution is ready to put in the place of it, is contrary to all politics, agreeing herein with morality, it were absurd to require, that every defect must be supplied or reformed directly and with precipitation: but it may be required of him, who has potency, that the maxim of the necessity of such a supplying, or reforming shall be intimately present with him, in order to remain in a constant approximation to the end (of the best constitution according to laws of right). A state may govern itself in a republican manner, though it, according to the present constitution still possesses despotical *sovereign potency*: till by degrees the nation becomes capable of the influence of the mere idea of the authority of the law (as if it possessed physical power), and is afterwards found qualified for its proper legislation (which is originally founded in right). If even by the vehemence of a *revolution* generated by a bad constitution a more legal one were wrongfully obtained, it must then be held no longer allowed to lead back the nation to the old constitution, though whilst it lasted every one, who interfered with it either violently or insidiously, would be justly subjected to the punishment due to a rebel. With regard to the external relation of states, a state cannot be desired to relinquish its constitution, though despotical (which is however the stronger relatively to external enemies), so long as it runs the risk of being instantly swallowed up by other states; consequently in every resolution the delay of the

execution till a better opportunity must be permitted.*

It may happen, that the moralists, who proceed despotically, failing in the execution, shall commit a number of faults in politics (by measures either taken or recommended precipitantly), and experience must teach them to correct by degrees these faults against nature; instead of which the moralizing politicians, by colouring wrongful principles of state, under the pretext of human nature's not being *capable* of the good, according to the idea, which reason prescribes, *render impossible*, as much as they can, the growing better, and eternalize the violation of right.

Instead of the praxis, of which these political men boast, they deal in *practices*, as they devise ways and means (by humouring the present ruling power, with a view to their own advantage) to give up the nation, and if possible the whole world, to be pillaged; like true jurists (of the profession, not of the *legislative*), when they soar above their own sphere to the region of politics. For as it is not
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* These are permissive laws of reason, to let the state of a public law charged with injustice remain, till the total circumvolving of every thing, either ripened of itself, or brought to maturity by pacific means: because any one *juridical*, though but in a small degree rightful, constitution is better than none at all, which latter state (anarchy) is the fate of a *precipitate* reform. — The wisdom of state, in the present situation of affairs, will therefore make it a duty, to reform suitably to the ideal of public law: but to use revolutions, when nature brings them on of herself, not for the purpose of varnishing a still greater oppression, but as the call of nature, to bring about, by a solid reform, a legal constitution founded in principles of liberty, as the only permanent one.

their business, to reason on legislation itself, but to execute the present commands of the law of the country, every legal constitution extant, and when this is altered by a higher power, the subsequent, must always be the best with them; where every thing then goes on in its proper mechanical order. But when the address, to accommodate themselves to every circumstance (*aptus cuivis*), instils into their minds the fancy of being able to judge of principles of a *constitution of state*, in general, according to conceptions of right (consequently *à priori*, not empirically), and when they vaunt of knowing *men* (which is indeed to be looked for, as they have to do with many), yet without knowing *man*, and what may be learned from him (to which a higher station of anthropological observation is requisite), and furnished with these conceptions, proceed on the law of state and of nations, as reason dictates it, they cannot make this transition, but with the spirit of chicane, as they pursue their usual procedure (of a mechanism according to coercive laws despotically given) even where the conceptions of reason will have a legal coercion founded but according to principles of liberty, by which only a stable constitution is first possible; which problem the pretended practitioner, passing by that idea in silence, believes to be able to solve empirically, from experience, as the constitutions of state hitherto the most durable, but for the most part contrary to right, were framed. — The maxims, which he uses (though tacitly) for this

purpose, turn pretty nearly upon the following sophistical ones.

1. *Fac et excusa.* Embrace the favourable opportunity of arbitrarily taking possession (either of a right of the state over its own, or over another neighbouring, nation); the justification will be much easier and more elegant *after the act*, and the violence more easily dressed in specious colours (especially in the first case, where the chief power in the interior is directly the legislative magistrate, who must be obeyed, without reasoning too nicely on the subject), than if one should first think on convincing reasons, and then wait for the objections. This effrontery itself gives a certain appearance of internal conviction of the rightfulness of the act, and the god *bonus eventus* is afterwards the best representative of right.

2. *Si fecisti nega.* Whatever thou hast committed thyself, for instance, if thou hast driven thy nation to despair, or to rebellion, deny that it is *thy* fault; but maintain that it is the refractoriness of the subjects, or if thou hast seized on the territory of a neighbouring nation, lay the blame on the nature of man, who, if he is not prevented by another by force, will certainly anticipate him and take possession of his territory.

3. *Divide et impera.* That is, if there are certain privileged chiefs in thy nation, who have chosen thee for their head merely (*primus inter pares*), disunite those from one another, and set them at variance with the nation; then support the latter, and amuse them with idle hopes

hopes of greater liberty, and everything will depend on thy unconditional will. Or, if they are foreign states, the stirring up of dissension among them is a pretty certain mean, under the appearance of assisting the weaker, of subjecting the one after the other.

Indeed nobody is now deceived by these political maxims; for they are all universally known; but the case never occurs where they are blushed at, as if the injustice were too glaring. For, as great powers are never ashamed of the judgment of the multitude, but only of that of one another, as to those principles, however, not their becoming public, but only their *miscarrying* can touch them with shame (for with regard to the morality of maxims the consension of the whole is complete), so the *political honour* always remains to them, on which they may count with certainty, namely, that of the *augmentation of their potency*, whatever be the means of acquisition.*

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* Though a certain vitiosity or pravity (rooted in human nature) of *men*, who live in the same state, may still be doubted, and, instead of it, the want of a culture not yet advanced far enough (rudeness) may be given with some appearance as the cause of the illegal phenomenon of their cast of mind; it is, in the relation of *states* towards one another, perfectly obvious and incontrovertible. In the interior of every state it is veiled by the coercion of civil laws, as a great power, to wit, that of the government, potently counteracts the inclination to the mutual violence of the citizens, and thus not only gives a moral varnish (*causae non causae*), if I may use the expression, but also, by preventing the eruption of illegal inclinations, the unfolding of the moral predisposition to the immediate reverence for right becomes actually much easier. — For every one believes that he would keep sacred and faithfully observe the
conception

From all these serpentine windings of an immoral doctrine of prudence, to produce the state of peace among men from the warlike state of the state of nature, so much at least is evident, That men can, as little in their private relations, as in their public, escape the conception of duty, and dare not found politics publicly upon knacks of prudence, consequently refuse all obedience to the conception of a public law (which is striking, chiefly in that of the law of nations), but ought to do it in itself all due honour, if they should invent a thousand evasions and palliations, in order to evitate it in the praxis, and to attribute to cunning power the authority, to be the origin and the band of all right. —

In order to put an end to this sophistry (if not to the injustice coloured by it), and to bring the false *representatives* of the mighty ones of the earth to the acknowledgment, that they do not speak in favour of right, but of power, of which they, as if they themselves
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conception of duty, if he could expect but the like from every other; which the government in part secures to him; whereby a great step is then taken *towards* morality (though not yet a moral step), to be attached to this conception of duty on its own account, without looking for a return. — But as every one, notwithstanding the good opinion he entertains of himself, presupposes a bad mindedness in every other, in this manner they judge of one another mutually, That, as to the *fact*, neither of them is good for much (the reason, as it cannot be laid to the charge of the *nature* of man, as a free being, may remain unexamined). However as the reverence for the conception of duty, which man can absolutely not avoid, sanctions in the most solemn manner the theory of the faculty to become suitable to that conception. every one perceives, that he must on his part act conformably to it, whatever others may do.

had a title to give orders in this, assume the tone, it will be expedient to discover the illusion, by which one deceives himself and others, to investigate the chief principle, from which proceeds the design of perpetual peace, and to point out, That all the bad, which hinders it, proceeds from the political moralist's beginning where the moral politician reasonably ends, and, by thus subordinating the principles to the end (that is, by putting the cart before the horse), he (the former) frustrates his own design, to bring politics to a good understanding with morality.

It is first necessary, in order to render practical philosophy consistent with itself, to decide the question, Whether in problems of practical reason the beginning must be made with its *material principle*, the *end* (as object of the arbitrament), or with the *formal*, that is, that (founded in liberty merely in the external relation) according to which it is said, Act so, that thou canst will, that thy maxim become an universal law (whatever be the end).

There is no doubt but the latter principle must precede; for it has, as a principle of right, unconditional necessity; instead of which the former is necessitating but on the presupposition of empirical conditions of the designed end, namely its execution, and, if this end (for instance, perpetual peace), were duty also, this even must have been derived from the formal principle of maxims to act externally. — The first principle now, that of the *political moralist* (the problem of the law

law of state, of nations, and of the cosmopolitical law), is a mere *technical problem*, whereas the second, as the principle of the *moral politician*, to whom it is a *moral problem*, is extremely different from the other in the procedure, in order to bring to pass everlasting peace, which is not wished for as a physical good merely, but also as a state proceeding from the agnition of duty.

To the resolution of the first, to wit, the *problem of the prudence of state*, great knowledge of nature is required, in order to employ its mechanism for the said end, and yet all this is uncertain in regard to its result, concerning perpetual peace; let either the one or the other of the three divisions of public law be taken. It is uncertain, whether the nation can be better kept in obedience and at the same time in a flourishing state by severity, or by the baits of vanity, whether by the supreme power of one only, or by the union of several chiefs, perhaps by a nobility of service merely, or by a power of the nation, in the interior, and that for any length of time.

Of all modes of government (the sole genuine republican mode excepted, but which can enter into the mind of none but a moral politician) examples of the contrary are to be met with in history. — Still more uncertain is a *law of nations* pretended to be erected upon statutes according to ministerial plans, which in fact is but a word void of reality, and rests upon contracts, which in the very act of their conclusion comprise at the same
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the secret reservation of their violation. — Whereas the solution of the second, namely, the *problem of the wisdom of state*, so to say, obtrudes itself naturally, is evident to every one, mars all subtlety, and thereby leads directly to the end; yet with the warning of prudence, not to bring it about precipitantly by force, but, according to the nature of favourable circumstances, to approach towards it incessantly.

Aspire first after the kingdom of pure practical reason and after its *justice*, and your end (the blessing, perpetual peace) will fall out of itself. For moral has the peculiarity in itself, with regard to its principles of public law, (consequently with reference to politics cognoscible *à priori*), that, the less it renders the conduct in order to the designed end dependent on the intended advantage, whether physical or moral, the more does it agree with this in general; because it is directly the universal will *given à priori* (in a nation, or in the relation of different nations among one another), which only determines what is law among men; but this union of the will of all, if one proceeds but consequentially, in the execution, may, even according to the mechanism of nature, at the same time be the cause of producing the effect aimed at, and of rendering the conception of right effectual. — Thus it is, for instance, a principle of the moral politics, That a nation ought to unite themselves in a state according to the only conceptions of right, liberty and equality, and this principle is not founded in prudence, but
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in duty. Let political moralists reason sophistically ever so much to the contrary on the natural mechanism of a multitude of men entering into society, which weakens those principles, and would disappoint their design; let them endeavour to prove their assertion to the contrary by examples of badly organized constitutions of ancient and more modern times (for instance, democracies without the system of representation), they merit no attention; especially, as such a pernicious theory occasions the evil itself it foretels, according to which man is thrown into the same class with the other living machines, to whom is wanting but the consciousness, that they are not free, in order to render them in their own judgment the most miserable of all sublunary beings.

The proverbial, and indeed somewhat hectoring, but true position, *Fiat justitia, pereat mundus*, that is to say, Let justice reign, though all the villains in the world should perish, is a vigorous principle of law cutting off all the crooked ways pointed out either by cunning, or by power; only, that it be not mistaken, and understood as a permission to make use of one's right with the greatest strictness (which would be repugnant to ethical duty), but as an obligation on those having potency, neither to refuse nor to lessen the right of any one against another, either out of disfavour or compassion; to which is chiefly requisite an internal constitution of state regulated according to pure principles of right, and also that of its union with other neighbouring or
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even distant states for the purpose of a legal making up of their differences (analagous to an universal state). — This position means nothing, but that the political maxims must not arise from the welfare and felicity of every state, to be expected from their observance, therefore not from the end, which each of them makes its object (from volition), as the chief (but empirical) principle of the wisdom of state, but from the pure conception of the duty of right (from what is expressed by *ought*, whose principle is given *à priori* by pure reason), let the physical consequences be what they will. Wicked men being made less numerous, will by no means occasion the fall of the world. The moral bad has the property inseparable from its nature, that it in its views (principally in relation to others of the same mind) is contrary to and destructive of itself, and so makes room, though by slow steps, for the (moral) principle of the good.

There is then *objectively* (in theory) no conflict at all between moral and politics; Whereas *subjectively* (in the selfish propension of men, but which, since it is not founded in maxims of reason, must not yet be named praxis), it will and may always remain, because it serves for a whetstone to virtue, whose true courage (according to the principle; *Tu ne cede malis, sed contra audentior ito*) in the present case does not so much consist in our resisting the evils and making the sacrifices here with a firm resolution, as in looking in the face and subduing the cunning of the much more dangerous, false and treacherous, but
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yet reasoning, bad principle in ourselves, which constantly deceives us by presenting to us the weakness of human nature as a justification of every transgression.

In fact the political moralists may say, That the regent and the nation, or nation and nation do *one another* no wrong, when they wage war with one another in either a violent or an insidious manner, though they do wrong in general, by refusing all reverence for the conception of right, which only can establish peace everlasting. For as the one transgresses his duty towards the other, who is just as wrongfully minded towards him, no wrong at all happens to either, when they destroy one another, yet so, that there may always remain enough of this race, not to let this play cease till the remotest times, in order that a late posterity may one day or other take a warning example by them. Providence is hereby justified in the course of the world; for the moral principle in man never extinguishes, reason pragmatically apposite to the execution of the juridical ideas according to that principle, increases constantly by culture always advancing, but with it the culpability of those transgressions too. The creation only seems not to be able to be vindicated by any *theodicee*, that such a race of corrupted men in general should have been on earth (when we suppose, that the human species neither will nor can be better disposed; but this station of judgment is far too high for us, to presume in a theoretical view, to apply our conceptions (of wisdom) to the Supreme Potency

tency, who is inscrutable for us. — We are inevitably driven to such desperate conclusions, when we do not assume, that the pure principles of right have objective reality, that is, may be put in execution; and the people in the state, and farther states towards one another, must act accordingly; whatever objections empirical politics may make. True politics can therefore take no step, without having previously done homage to moral, and though politics of themselves are a difficult art, there is no art at all in uniting them with moral; for, as soon as they clash, this cuts the knot, which those cannot untie. — The rights of man must be held sacred, let the sacrifice, which the sovereign power may make, be ever so great. One cannot halve here, and devise the medium or adiaphory of a pragmatically conditional right (between right and profit), but all politics must bend the knee to morality, they may hope, however, to attain the degree, though slowly, where they will permanently shine.

Of the Consonance of Politics with Moral according to the transcendental Conception of Public Law.*

When we abstract from all *matter* of public law (either according to the different empirically

* See the distinction made, in this mode of philosophising, between *transcendental* and *transcendent*, in the preface to THE PRINCIPLES OF CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY, by the translator, page xxviii.

cally given relations of men in the state, or of states among one another), as the teachers of law commonly cogitate it, the *form of publicity*, whose possibility every claim of right comprises, still remains to us, for without that there were no justice (which can be conceived but as capable of being made *publicly known*), consequently no right, which is distributed but by it.

Every claim of right must have this capability of publicity, and, as it may be easily judged, whether in an occurring case it has place, that is, whether it may be united or not with the principles of the actor, it can furnish a criterion, to be met with in reason *à priori*, easily used, to cognise directly in the latter case, as if by an experiment of pure reason, the falsity (contrariety to law) of the said claim (*pretensio juris*).

After such an abstraction from all that is empirical, contained in the conception of the law of state and of nations (such is the pravity of human nature, which renders coercion necessary), the following position may be denominated the *transcendental formulæ of public law*: *Relatively to the rights of other men, all actions, whose maxim doth not accord with publicity, are unjust.*

This principle is not to be considered as ethical merely (belonging to the doctrine of virtue), but also as *juridical* (concerning the rights of man). For a maxim, which I dare not *divulge*, without thereby frustrating at the same time my own design, which, in order that it may prosper, must absolutely
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be concealed, and which I cannot publicly own, without infallibly exciting the resistance of every one, cannot bring on me this necessary and universal, therefore *a priori* respectable, opposition of all, but by the injustice, with which it threatens every body. Again, this principle is *negative* merely, that is, it serves but to cognise by its means, what is *not right* with regard to others. It is like an axiom self-evident or indemonstrably certain, and besides easy to be applied, as may be perceived by the following examples of public law;

1. *With regard to the law of state (jus civitatis)*, namely, the internal one, in it occurs the question, which many consider as difficult to be answered, and which the transcendental principle of publicity resolves with the greatest facility, *videlicet*, Is rebellion a rightful mean for a nation to shake off the oppressive power of a tyrant so named (*non titulo sed exercitio talis*)? The rights of the nation are violated, and no wrong is done to him (the tyrant) by the dethroning; this is beyond a doubt. It is however not less wrong in the highest degree in the subjects, to seek their rights in this manner, and they can just as little complain of injustice, should they be defeated in this struggle and afterwards obliged to suffer in consequence thereof the most rigorous punishment.

Much may be said on both sides of the question if one chuses to decide it by a dogmatical deduction of the titles; but the transcendental principle of publicity of public law

may save itself the trouble of this prolixity. According to this principle, let the nation, previously to the entering into the civil contract, question itself, Whether it would presume, to make the maxim of the resolution on an occasional revolt publicly known. It is obvious, that, in founding a constitution of state, were it made a condition, to use force in certain occurring cases against the head, the nation must assume to itself a rightful potency over that head. But then he would not be the head, or, if both were made conditions of the establishment of the state, no establishment at all of a state would be possible, which would however be contrary to the design of the nation. The injustice of rebellion is evident, as its maxim, by *avowing it publicly*, would render its own design impossible. It must therefore be necessarily concealed. But this would not be necessary on the side of the head of the state. He may proclaim, that he will inflict the punishment of death on the ringleaders of every rebellion, let these still believe, that he has first transgressed the fundamental law; for when the head is conscious to himself, to possess the *irresistible* supreme power (which must be supposed in every civil constitution, because he, who has not might enough, to protect every one in the nation against others, has not the right to give him orders), he needs not be under any apprehension, to defeat his own design by his maxim's being made known; with which principle it is also perfectly coherent, that, should the nation

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tion succeed in the rebellion; that head must retire to the station of a subject, and must never stir up a rebellion with a view to recover his power; but he must not have to fear being called to an account for his former government of the state.

2. *With regard to the law of nations.* — A law of nations can be in question but on the presupposition of some one juridical state, or other (that is, that external conjunction, in which man actually acquires a right); because it, as a public law, involves in its conception the publication of an universal will determining to every one what is his due, and this *status juridicus* must arise out of some one contract or other, which needs not just be founded upon coercive laws (like those, from which a state springs), but may be a *continuing free* association, like the above-mentioned of the confederation of different states. For without some one *juridical state*, which connects actively the different (physical or moral) persons, consequently in the state of nature, there can be no other, than merely a private law. — There now happens a difference between politics and moral (this considered as law), where that criterion of the publicity of maxims may likewise be easily applied, yet only so, That the contract binds the states but with the view, to keep themselves in peace among one another and with other states, but by no means in order to make acquisitions. — The following cases of the antinomy between politics and moral present themselves here, with

which their solution is at the same time combined:

a. When one of these states has promised something to the other, let it be succour, cession of certain lands, or subsidies and such like, the question is, whether, in a case, on which depends the welfare of the state, it can free itself from keeping its word, by pretending to consider itself in a double capacity, first as *sovereign*, who is not responsible to any body in the state; but next as *chief officer of state*, who must be accountable to the state; as then the consequence would be, that he would free himself in the second quality from what he had obliged himself to in the first. But if a state (or its head) should let these its maxims become publicly known, every other would naturally either fly it, or unite with others, in order to resist its usurpations, which evinces, that politics notwithstanding all their sliness, would in this way (of publicity) disappoint their very end, consequently that maxim must be wrong,

b. When a neighbouring power, increased to a tremendous greatness (*potentia tremenda*), occasions apprehension, May it be supposed, that it will, because it *can*, be *disposed* to oppress, and does that give a right to the less powerful states; without any previous offence, to attack (conjointly)? — A state, that *gave out* its maxim affirmatively in this case, would bring the evil to pass but still more certainly and more quickly. For the greater power would be beforehand with the smaller ones, and, as to the union of the latter, that

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is but a weak defence against those, who know how to profit by *divide et impera*. — This maxim of politics, publicly declared, balks of necessity its own design, and is by consequence wrong.

c. When a smaller state interrupts, by its situation the connexion, necessary to the support and defence of a greater state, Is the latter not entitled to subdue the former, and to incorporate it with itself? — It is very obvious, that the greater must by no means let such a maxim transpire previously, for either the smaller states would unite themselves betimes, or other potencies would dispute the prey, consequently this maxim renders itself impracticable by its very publicity; a sign, that it is unjust and may be so in a very great degree; for a small object of injustice doth not prevent the injustice proved by it from being very great.

3. *With regard to the cosmopolitical law,* I pass it over here in silence: because, on account of the analogy between it and the law of nations, its maxims are easily formed and estimated.

The principle of the incompatibility of the maxims of the law of nations with publicity, affords us an excellent criterion, it is true, of the *discordancy* of politics with moral (as law). But we require still to be informed of the condition, on which their maxims agree with the law of nations. For it cannot be conversely concluded, that the maxims, which bear publicity, are on that account just; because, whoever has the decided

superiority of power, needs not conceal his maxims. — The condition of the possibility of a law of nations in general is, That a *juridical state* shall first exist. For without this there is no public law, but all law, which may be conceived besides that (in the state of nature), is private law merely. We have seen above, That a federative situation of states, merely with a view to put a stop to war, is the only *juridical* situation, possible to be united with their *liberty*. Therefore the harmony of politics with morality is possible in a federal union only (which is given *à priori* according to principles of law and is necessary), and all politics have the founding of it, in its greatest possible compass, for their proper basis, without which end all their acumen is but insipience and veiled injustice. — These spurious politics have, as well as the best school of Jesuits, their *CASUISTRY* — *the reservatio mentalis*: in drawing up public contracts, couched in such expressions, which may be occasionally explained to one's own advantage, as one pleases (for instance, the distinction between *status quo de fait* and *de droit*); — the *probabilism*: to impute bad intentions to others, or also to make probabilities of their possible preponderancy the title to the undermining of other peaceable states; — finally the *peccatum philosophicum* (*peccatillum, bagatelle*): To hold the swallowing up of a small state, when a much *greater one* profits by it with a view to the imaginary greater prosperity

urity of mankind, a trifle, or at most a very pardonable fault.*

This is aided by the deceitfulness of politics in regard of moral, to make use of either the one or the other branch of it for their own purpose. — Both, philanthropy and reverence for the *rights* of man, are duty; but that *conditional* only, this on the contrary *unconditional*, absolutely commanding duty, which he, who is disposed to give himself up to the agreeable, feeling of beneficence, must be first fully assured not to have transgressed. Politics easily coincide with moral in the first sense (as ethics), in order to deliver up the rights of men to their superiors: But with that in the second sense (as law), to which they must bend the knee, they find it adviseable not to engage in a contract, but rather to refuse all reality, and to interpret all duties as mere benevolence; which artifice of politics shunning the light philosophy would easily baffle by means of the publicity of those its maxims, if politicians would but venture to give assistance to this publicity.

In this view I have to propose another transcendental and positive principle of public law, whose formule is, *All maxims, which,*

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* Professor Garve's *Treatise on the Conjunction of Moral with Politics*, 1788, bears testimony to such maxims. This worthy and learned man owns at the beginning of his work, not to be able to give a satisfactory answer to this question. But yet to approve of it, though indeed with the avowal, not to be able to answer fully the objections made to it, seems to be a greater condescension towards those, who are very much inclined to abuse it, than might be adviseable.

in order not to miss their end, stand in need of publicity, agree with law and politics united.

For, if they can obtain their end but by publicity, they must be conformable to the universal end of the public (felicity), to harmonize with which (to make it satisfied with its situation), is the peculiar problem of politics. But if this end shall be attainable *but* by publicity, that is, by the removal of all distrust from its maxims, these must also agree with the law of the public; for in this only is the union of the ends of all possible. — I must defer the farther amplification and exposition of this principle till another occasion; I shall only add, that it may be perceived to be a transcendental formule, from the removing of all empirical conditions (of felicity), as the matter of the law, and from the mere regard to the form of the universal legality.

To conclude, If it is duty, if at the same time there is a well-founded hope, to realize, though but in an approximation advancing to infinite, the state of a public law, EVERLASTING PEACE, which succeeds to the treaties or conclusions of peace hitherto-falsely so named (more properly truces), is not a void idea, but a problem which, resolved by degrees, draws constantly nearer to its object, as it is to be hoped that less and less time will be requisite to equal progressions.

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To intersperse conjectures in the progress of a history, in order to fill up chasms in the accounts, is by all means allowable; because the preceding, as the remote cause, and the following, as the effect, may furnish a pretty sure guidance to the discovery of the middle causes, in order to render the transition comprehensible. But, to let a history arise out of conjectures entirely, seems little better, than to delineate the plan of a romance. It would not bear the name of even a *conjectural history*, but of a mere *fiction*. — Yet that, which cannot be ventured on in the process of the history of human actions, may be attempted by conjecture on its *first beginning*, so far as *nature* makes it. For this must not be feigned, but may be collected from experience; when it is presupposed, that those actions were neither better nor worse in the first beginning, than we meet with them at present: a presupposition, which is conformable to the analogy with nature, and carries with it nothing hazarded. A history of the first unfolding of liberty from its original predisposition

tion in the nature of man, is therefore quite different from the history of liberty in its progress, which can be founded but upon narrations.

However, as conjectures must not carry their pretensions to assent too high, but must announce themselves as a permitted exercise of the imagination only accompanied with reason, for the unbending and for the health of the mind, but not as a serious occupation; so they cannot vie with that history, which is written on the very same event as an actual account and believed, whose proof rests upon quite other grounds, than mere philosophy of nature. For which reason, and as I set out here on a mere journey of pleasure; I may hope for the favour, to be allowed to make use of a sacred record as a map thereto; and at the same time to fancy, that the flight, which I take on the wings of imagination, though not without a clew connected with experience by reason, will fall on the very same line, which that record contains historically drawn. The reader will please to turn over its leaves (Gen. Chap. II—VI.) and observe, step by step, whether the way, which philosophy goes according to conceptions, coincide with that which history points out.

If we would not perplex and lose ourselves in a maze of conjectures, the beginning must be made from that, which is not susceptible of a derivation from prior causes of nature by human reason, therefore, with the *existence of man*; in his *full growth*, as he must do without maternal assistance: *in one pair*, in
order

order to propagate his species; and but *one pair*, that the flames of war may not be directly kindled, if men were in the neighbourhood and yet foreign to one another, or also that nature be not accused that she has, by the difference of descent, let the fittest preparation for sociableness, as the greatest end of the human destination, be wanting; for the unity of the family, from which all men are descended, is doubtless the best disposition for that purpose. I put this pair in a place secured from the attack of beasts of prey, and abundantly supplied by nature with all the means of food, therefore as if in a *garden*, in a climate always mild and temperate. And besides, I contemplate them, only after they have made considerable progress in the address to use their powers, and of course do not begin from the total rudeness of their nature; for, should I undertake to fill up this chasm, which in all likelihood comprehends a great period, there might easily be too many conjectures for the reader but too few probabilities. The first man then could *stand and walk*; he could *speak* (Gen. ch. II. v. 20.)* nay, *talk*,
that

* The instinct to communicate his thoughts must have first prompted man, who is yet alone, to the making known of his existence to other living beings, chiefly those that utter a sound, which he can imitate and which may afterwards serve for a name. A similar effect of this instinct may be perceived in children and in thoughtless people, who, by speaking in the throat, crying, whistling, singing, and other noisy entertainment (and frequently devotion of the same nature) disturb the thinking part of mankind. For I can conceive no other motive to this, than that they wish to publish their existence around them.

that is, speak according to coherent conceptions (v. 23), consequently *think*. Mere addresses, all of which he must acquire himself (for were they imprinted by the Creator, they would also be transmitted by inheritance, which is however repugnant to experience); but with which I suppose him to be now provided, in order to take into contemplation the unfolding of what is moral in his actions, which necessarily presupposes that address.

Only instinct, this *voice of God*, to which all animals hearken, must in the beginning guide the novice. This allowed him some things for food, and forbid him others (III. 2. 3.). — But it is not necessary to suppose a peculiar, at present lost instinct for this behoof; it may have been the sense of smelling merely, and its affinity with the organ of taste, the known sympathy of this latter however with the organs of digestion, and thus in a manner the faculty of the presension of the fitness or of the unfitness of food, such as one still perceives. One needs not even suppose this sense acuter in the first pair, than it is at present; for it is sufficiently known what difference may be found in the power of perception between the men occupied about their senses merely, and those conversant about their thoughts at the same time, but thereby diverted from their sensations.

As long as the unexperienced man obeyed this call of nature, he found his account in it. But *reason* soon began to manifest itself, and endeavoured to extend his knowledge of food *beyond the limits of instinct* (III. 6.) by comparison

ri-son of what he had eaten with that which a sense, different from that to which instinct was bound, perhaps the sense of seeing, represented as similar to what he had already eaten. This trial might have accidentally succeeded well enough, though instinct did not advise it, if it did but not contradict. But, it is a property of reason, that it can, with the assistance of the imagination, counterfeit appetites, not only *without* an instinct directed, but even *contrary*, to them, which in the beginning take the name of *concupis- cence*, but whereby a whole swarm of unne- cessary, nay, even unnatural inclinations is brooded, under the name of *luxury*. The oc- casion of becoming disobedient to instinct needed be but a trifle; but the consequence of the first essay, namely, to become con- scious to one's self of one's reason as a faculty, that can extend itself beyond the limits, where- in all animals are kept, was of great impor- tance and decisive for the mode of life. Were it but a fruit, whose look, by the likeness to other agreeable fruits which one had tasted before, invites to a trial; if besides the example of an animal were added, to whose nature such a food is suitable, as on the contrary it is hurtful to man, and consequently there is an instinct which opposes it; this might give reason the first occasion to chicanery the *voice* of nature (III. 1.), and in spite of its contradiction, to make the first trial of a free choice, which, as the first, in all probability did not fall out agreeably to expectation. How insignifi- cant soever the harm may have been, man's

eyes were now opened (v. 7.). He discovered in himself a faculty, to choose for himself a manner of life, and not to be bound like other animals to a single one. On the instantaneous complacency, which this observed preference might excite in him, anxiety and embarrassment must directly follow; how he, who yet knew nothing according to its hidden qualities and remote effects, should go to work with his new discovered faculty. He stood, as it were, on the brink of an abyss; for, from single objects of his desire, which instinct had hitherto shown him, to him an infinity of them was opened whose choice he did not yet understand at all; and it was now impossible for him to return from this once tried state of liberty to that of thralldom (under the dominion of instinct).

Next to the instinct to nourishment, by which nature supports every individual, the *instinct to sex*, whereby she takes care of the preservation of every species, is the most eximious. Reason once put in action did not delay to prove its influence on this. Man quickly found, that the stimulation to sex, which rests with animals in a merely transitory, for the most part periodical instinct, with him is capable of prolongation and even of augmentation by the phansy, which transacts its business with more moderation, but at the same time more durably and more uniformly, the more the object is *withdrawn from the senses*, and that thereby the disgust, which the satiating of a merely animal appetite carries with it, is avoided. The fig-leaf (v. 7.)
was

was the production of a far greater manifestation of reason, than it evinced in the first step of its développement. For thereby to render an inclination more intimate and more lasting, by withdrawing its object from the senses, shews the consciousness of some superiority of reason over instinct; and not merely, like the first step, a faculty to serve it to a smaller or to a greater extent. *Refusing* was the artifice to transport insensibly from the merely animal desire to love, and with this from the feeling of the mere agreeable to the taste for beauty, in the beginning in men only, but then in nature likewise. *Modesty*, an inclination by good manners and decency (concealing what might excite slighting) to inspire others with reverence for us, as the proper groundwork of all true sociableness, gave besides the first hint for the cultivation of man, as a moral creature. — A small beginning, but which constitutes an epoch, by giving a quite new direction to the cast of mind, is more important, than the whole infinite series of the subsequent enlargements of culture.

The third step of reason, after it had taken part in the first immediately felt wants, was the reflected *expectation of the future*. This faculty, not merely to enjoy the present moment of life, but to render present to one's self the coming, frequently very distant, time, is the most decisive criterion of the preference of man, to prepare himself for remote ends conformably to his destination, — but at the same time the not to be dried up source of fear and sadness, which the uncertain futurity oc-

casions, and which all animals are freed from (v. 15—19). Man, who had to maintain himself and a wife, together with future children, foresaw the constantly increasing painfulness of his labour; the woman foresaw the troubles, to which nature had subjected her sex, and over and above those, which the more powerful man would impose on her. After a life of hardships both foresaw with terror in the back-ground of the picture that, which inevitably happens to all animals, yet without making them uneasy, namely, death; and seemed to rebuke and make a crime of the use of reason, which occasions them all these evils. To live in their posterity, who may perhaps be less unhappy, or even as members of a family alleviate their troubles, was probably the only consolatory prospect, that strengthened their dejected minds (16—20).

The fourth and last step, which reason advanced, totally elevating man above the society with beasts, was, That he (though but obscurely) comprehended, that he is properly the *end of nature*, and nothing that lives upon the earth can be his competitor for this. The first time he said to the sheep, *Nature did not give thee the pelt, thou wearest, for thyself, but for me*, stript him of it and put it on himself (v. 21.); he perceived a prerogative, that he, by virtue of his nature, has above all animals, which he now considered no more as his copartners in the creation, but as the means and instruments left to his will for the accomplishment of his purposes at pleasure. This representation comprehends
(though

(though obscurely) the thought of the opposite position, to wit, that he dares not speak thus to any *man*, but must consider him as an equal partaker of the gifts of nature: a remote preparative to the restrictions, which reason afterwards imposes on the will with regard to his fellow-man, and which is far more necessary to the establishment of society, than inclination and love.

And thus man entered into an *equality with all rational beings*, whatever might be their rank, (III. 22.), namely, with regard to the pretension *to be himself an end*, to be esteemed by every other as such, and to be used by no other as a mean barely to other ends. Herein, and not in reason, as it is considered as an instrument merely to the satisfaction of the diverse inclinations, lies the ground of the so unlimited equality of man, even with superior beings, who may otherwise surpass him beyond all comparison in the gifts of nature, but none of whom has on that account a right to dispose of him according to mere pleasure. Hence this step is at the same time combined with his dismissal from the maternal lap of nature; an alteration, which is indeed honourable, but at the same time very dangerous, as it turned him out of the harmless and secure state of being nursed as a child, in a manner out of a garden, which furnished him with necessaries without his giving himself any trouble (v. 23.), and thrust him out into the wide world, where so many cares, troubles and unknown evils await him. For the future the hardships and miseries of life

will often draw from him the wish for a paradise, the creature of his imagination, where he may dream or trifle away his existence in tranquil inactivity and constant peace. But restless reason, irresistibly inciting him to the unfolding of the faculties placed in him, is encamped between him and that fancied seat of joy, and does not allow him to return to the state of rudeness and simplicity, from which it has taken him (v. 24.). It instigates him to take upon himself patiently the trouble, which he hates, to run after the gewgaws he despises, and to forget even death itself, which he cannot think of without horror, being taken up with all those trifles, whose loss he dreads still more.

Observation.

From this representation of the first history of mankind it follows, That man's leaving paradise, represented to him by reason as the first abode of his species, was nothing but the transition from the rudeness of a merely animal creature to humanity, from the go-cart of instinct to the guidance of reason, in a word, From the guardianship of nature to the state of liberty. Whether man has won or lost by this alteration, cannot be any longer the question, when one considers the destination of his species, that consists in nothing but in the *advancing* towards perfection, however imperfectly might fall out the first endeavours to reach this aim, even following one another in a long series of their members. —

However

However this course, which for the species is a *progress* from the bad to the better, is not the same for the individual. Before reason awoke there was neither a commandment, nor a prohibition, consequently no transgression; but when it (reason) entered on its office, and, weak as it is, mingled with the animality and its whole force, evils must arise, and, what is worse, with more cultivated reason, vices, which were totally foreign to the state of ignorance, therefore of innocence. The first step then out of this state was on the moral side a *fall*; on the physical were a multitude of never known evils of life the consequence of this fall, therefore punishment. Thus the history of *nature* begins from the good, for it is the *work of God*; the history of *liberty* from the bad, for it is the *work of man*. To the individual, who in the use of his liberty looks to himself merely, there was in such an alteration a loss; to nature, who directs its end with man towards the species, it was a gain. Hence the individual has cause to ascribe to his own guilt all the evil, which he suffers, and all the bad that he commits, but at the same time as a member of the whole (of a species) to admire and to praise the wisdom and the conformity-to-end of the arrangement. — In this manner may be made to accord with themselves, and with reason the assertions of the celebrated J. J. Rousseau, so often misinterpreted, and according to appearance colliding with one another. In his publication *on the influence of the sciences* and in that *on the inequality of men*

he shows perfectly right the unavoidable collision of culture with the nature of the human species, as a *physical* species, in which every individual ought to attain his destination totally; but in his *Emil*, his *Social Contract*, and other writings, he endeavours to solve the more difficult problem, How culture must go on, in order to unfold the predispositions of humanity, as a *moral* species, suitably to their destination, so that this may no longer collide with that as a species natural. From this collision (as culture, according to true *principles of education* for the *man* and for the *citizen* at the same time, is perhaps not yet properly begun, much less ended) spring all the real evils, which oppress human life, and all the vices that disgrace it;* as the incitements

* In order to produce but a few examples of this collision between the efforts of humanity with a view to its moral destination, on the one side, and the unalterable observance of the laws placed in its nature for the rude and animal state, on the other, take the following.

The epoch of full age or majority, that is, of the instinct, as well as the faculty, to propagate one's species, nature has fixed at about the age of 16 or 17 years: an age, at which the youth in the rude state of nature literally becomes a man; for he then has the faculty to support himself, to propagate his species, and also to maintain it together with his wife. The simplicity of the wants renders this easy for him. Whereas in the cultivated state many means of acquisition belong to the latter, as well in address, as in favourable external circumstances, so that this epoch, in the civil state, is delayed 19 years at least one with another. Nature however has not at the same time altered her period of maturity with the progress of the civil refinement, but follows obstinately her law, which she intended for the maintaining of the human species, as a species of animals. Hence arises now an unavoidable damage to the end of nature by morals, and *vice versa*. For the man of nature is already in a certain age a man, when the civil man (who does

ments to the latter, which one blames on that account, are good in themselves and conformable-

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able-

does not yet cease to be a man of nature) is but a youth, nay, even but a child, for one may well name him so, who, on account of his years (in the civil state) cannot support even himself, much less his species, though he has for him the instinct and the faculty, consequently the call of nature, to propagate it. For nature has surely not placed instincts and faculties in living creatures, in order that they should combat and suppress them. Therefore the predisposition to those was not at all designed for the civilized state, but merely for the support of the human species as a species of animals; and the civilised state falls into an inevitable collision with the latter, to which a perfect civil constitution only (the ultimate aim of culture) can put an end, as at present that interval is commonly filled with vices, and their consequence, various human miseries.

Another example as a proof of the truth of the position, That nature has implanted in us two predispositions for two different ends, namely, for humanity as a species of animals, and for the very same as a moral species, is the *Ars longa, vita brevis* of Hippocrates. Sciences and arts might be carried to a far higher pitch by one head that is organized for them, when he has once attained by long exercise and acquired knowledge the proper maturity of judgment, than whole generations of the learned might do successively, if he lived but with the same juvenile power of mind the time, which is granted to all these generations. Now nature has manifestly taken her resolution with regard to man's duration of life from another point of view, than from that of the furtherance of sciences. For, when the man of the most happy understanding is at the point of making the greatest discoveries, which he has reason to hope for from his address and experience, age advances; his faculties grow blunt, and he must leave to a second generation (which begins anew from A B C, and must once more journey over the whole track, that was already explored), to add another step to the progress of culture. The course of the human species to the attaining of its whole destination seems for that reason incessantly interrupted, and to be in constant danger to fall back into the old rudeness; and the Grecian philosopher did not complain entirely without reason, that *it is a pity, that one must die, when one has just begun to perspect, how one ought to live.*

A third example may be the inequality among men, and not that of the gifts of nature or of the goods of fortune, but of the universal rights of them, an inequality, of which Rousseau complains with great justice, but which is not to be

be

able-to-end as predispositions of nature, but these predispositions, as they were adjusted to the mere state of nature, suffer damage by advancing culture, and in return endamage it, till perfect art becomes nature again, which is the ultimate aim of the moral destination of the human species.

Conclusion of the History.

The beginning of the following period is, That man passes from the period of ease and of peace *to that of labour and of discord*, as the prelude to the union in society. Here we must again take a great leap, and put him at once in the possession of domestic animals, and of plants, which he himself can multiply by sowing and planting for his food (IV. 2.); though the transition from the savage live of a hunter to the former, and from the unsteady digging of roots or the collecting of fruits in the second state, may have been slow enough. Here now must begin the difference between men hitherto living amicably beside one another, whose consequence was the separation and

be separated from culture, as long as it in a manner proceeds without a plan (which is however unavoidable during a long time), and to which nature had certainly not destined man; as she gave him liberty, and reason to restrict this liberty by nothing but its (reason's) own universal and external legality, which is denominated *the civil right or law*. Man ought to extricate himself from the rudeness of his very predispositions of nature, and, raising himself above them, take care nevertheless not to commit a fault against them: an address, which he can expect but late; and after many miscarrying essays, during which interval humanity groans under the evils that it brings upon itself from inexperience.

and dispersion upon the earth of those of a different mode of life. The *life of a herdsman* is not only easy, but, as there can be no want of pasture in an extensive uninhabited land, affords the most certain subsistence. Whereas *agriculture*, or planting, is very troublesome, depending on the inconstancy of the weather, consequently insecure, and requires a permanent abode, property of the soil, and sufficient power to defend it; but the herdsman hates this property, which limits his liberty of grazing. As to the former, the husbandman might seem to envy the herdsman as more favoured by heaven (v. 4.); in fact, however, the latter, so long as he remained in his neighbourhood, was very burdensome to him; for the grazing cattle did not spare his fields and plantations. As it was easy for the herdsman, after the damage which he had occasioned, to remove to a great distance with his herd, and to avoid all indemnification, because he leaves nothing behind him, which he does not find just as well every-where else; so it was natural for the husbandman to use force against such encroachments (which the other did not hold unallowed) and, as the occasion to such could never totally cease, in order not to lose the fruits of his long labour, finally carried that force as far as he possibly could, so that those who lead the life of herdsmen were *obliged to go away*. (v. 16.). This separation makes the third epoch.

A soil, on whose cultivation and planting (chiefly with trees) depends the means of supporting life, requires permanent habitations; and

and the defence of them against all outrages stands in need of a number of men to assist one another. Therefore in this way of life men could no longer disperse themselves in families, but were under the necessity of keeping together, and of erecting villages (improperly named *cities*), in order to defend their property against either wild hunters, or hordes of wandering herdsmen. The first necessities of life, whose provision required a *different mode of life* (v. 20.), could now be exchanged for one another. Thence must arise *culture*, and the beginning of *art*, of pastime, as well as of industry (v. 21. 22.); as also, what is of the greatest moment, some preparation for a civil constitution and public justice, at first indeed but with regard to the greatest violences, whose avenging was no longer left, as in the savage state, to individuals, but to a legislative potency, which contained the whole, that is, a mode of government, over which itself no exercise of power had place (v. 23. 24.). — From this first and rude predisposition could now develop itself by degrees all human art, of which that of *sociableness* and *civil security* is the most salutary, the human species increase itself and, from a centre, like bee-hives, extend everywhere by sending abroad and planting colonies already civilized. With this epoch commenced likewise the *inequality* among men, this abundant source of so much bad, but of all that is good also, and henceforth increased.

So long as the nomades or nations of herdsmen, who acknowledge God only for their
master,

master, swarmed around the inhabitants of the city and husbandmen, who have a man (a magistrate) for a master (VI. 4.),* and as sworn enemies to all landed property bore an ill will to these and were in return hated by them; there was continual war between them, at least incessant danger of it, and hence both nations might be glad in the interior at least of the inestimable good, liberty. — (for still at present nothing but the danger of war moderates despotism; because riches are requisite at present to constitute a state a potency, but without *liberty* neither the activity nor the industry, which could produce riches, has place. Instead of which in a poor nation great participation in the support of the commonwealth must be met with; which on the other hand is not otherwise possible, than when the citizens feel themselves therein *free*). — In process of time however the beginning luxury of the inhabitants of the city, but chiefly the art of pleasing, whereby the city ladies eclipse the dirty women of the woods, must have been a great allurements for those herdsmen (v. 2.), to enter into a conjunction with these, and to partake of the splendid misery of the city. Which then, by the incorporating of two nations formerly inimical to one another,

* The Arabian Bedouines still name themselves children of an ancient *Schech*, the founder of their tribe (as Beni Haled etc.). He is by no means their master, and can exercise no power over them at pleasure. For in a nation of herdsmen, where nobody has immoveable property, which he must leave behind, every family that is dissatisfied may easily separate itself from the tribe, in order to join and strengthen another.

another, with the end of all danger of war inevitably occasioned at the same time the end of all liberty, thus the despotism of mighty tyrants on the one side, with culture yet scarcely begun but soulless luxury in abject servitude, mixed with all the vices of the rude state, on the other, averted the human species from the progress of the cultivation of its predispositions to the good, pointed out to it by nature; and thereby rendered it unworthy of even its existence, as a species destined to rule over the earth, not to enjoy brutishly, and to serve slavishly (v. 17.).

Concluding Observation.

The man of reflection, when he computes the evils, which oppress the human species so much, and (as it seems) without hope of its growing better, feels a sorrow that can even become corruption of morals, of which the thoughtless knows nothing, namely, discontentment with Providence, who governs the course of the world on the whole. It is however of the greatest moment, *to be contented with Providence*, (though he has traced out for us in our terrestrial world a path so difficult): partly in order to resume courage still under the hardships, and partly in order, while we throw the blame on fate, not to lose sight of our own fault, which may perhaps be the only cause of all this evil, and to neglect the remedy in the self-amendment.

One must own, that the greatest evils, which oppress civilized nations, are brought
on

on us by war, and indeed not so much by that which is present or past, as by the never remitting and even incessantly increased preparation for the future. To this are employed all the powers of the state, all the fruits of its culture, which might be used for a still greater culture; liberty is in so many places violated, and the maternal care of the state of single members transformed into an inexorable strictness of demands, yet this is justified by the apprehension of outward danger. But, would this culture, would this close conjunction of the ranks of the commonwealth to the mutual furtherance of their prosperity, would the population, nay, even the degree of liberty which, though under very restrictive laws, yet remains, be met with, if that war itself, which is always dreaded, did not extort from the heads of states this *reverence for humanity*? Only behold China, which from its situation has perhaps one day to fear an unforeseen attack, but no potent enemy, and from which therefore every trace of liberty is effaced. — On the step of culture, then, on which the human species yet stands, war is an indispensable mean to carry it higher; and but after a finished culture (God knows when) would an everduring peace be salutary for us and also by that only possible. Consequently, as to this point, we ourselves are the cause of the evils, of which we complain so bitterly; and the sacred record is perfectly right to represent the incorporating of nations into one society and their complete deliverance from all outward danger, as their culture was scarcely begun.

begun, as a stopping of all further culture and a sinking into incurable corruption.

The second discontentment of men arraigns the order of nature with regard to the *shortness of life*. One must understand but very ill indeed the estimation of the value of life, if one can still wish, that it should last longer, than it actually does; for that were but a lengthening of a play constantly struggling with mere difficulties. But a childish judgment needs not be blamed for fearing death, without loving life, and, whilst it is difficult for it to pass its existence every single day with tolerable satisfaction, never to have days enow to repeat this complaint. When however one but reflects, how much care of the means to passing away a life so short torments us, how much injustice is exercised with the hope of a future enjoyment, though of so short a duration; one must reasonably believe, that if men could prolong their lives to an age of 800 years and more, the father would scarcely be secure of his life against his son, the one brother against the other, or one friend beside another, and that the vices of a human species living so long would rise to such a height, that they would be worthy of no better a fate, than to be drowned in a universal flood (v. 12, 15.).

The third wish, or rather, empty longing (for we are conscious to ourselves, that we never can obtain what is wished for) is the shadow, the *golden age* so much praised by poets, where a deliverance from all imaginary wants, with which luxury loads us, a sufficiency

ciency with the mere wants of nature, a thorough equality of men, an everlasting peace among them, in a word, the pure enjoyment of a life free from care dreamt away in idleness or trifled away in puerile amusements; — an earnest desire, which makes the Crusoes and the voyages to the southsea islands so charming, but in general evinces the weariness, which the thinking man feels in the civilized life, when he seeks its value in *enjoyments* merely, and takes into the account the counterbalance of laziness, when reason by chance puts him in mind, to give a value to life by *actions*. The justness of the wish to return to that time of simplicity and innocence is sufficiently shown, when one is animated by the above representation of the original state: man cannot maintain himself therein, because he is not contented with it; still less is he inclined ever to return to it; so that he has always to attribute to himself and to his own choice the present state of troubles.

Advantageous to man and serviceable to instruction and to amendment is then such an exhibition of his history, which points out to him, That he must not charge Providence with the evils that afflict him; that he is not entitled to impute his own transgression to an original crime of his first parents, whereby a propensity in a manner to similar transgressions would be hereditary in the offspring, (for arbitrable actions can carry nothing with them possible to be communicated by inheritance); but that he in all justice has to acknowledge what has happened as committed

by himself, and to lay to his own charge entirely all the evils, which spring from the abuse of his reason, as he may be very conscious to himself, that in similar circumstances he would conduct himself in the same manner, and would make the first use of reason, to misuse it (even contrary to the hint of nature). The physical evils, when that point concerning the moral ones is cleared up, can then, in the balancing of merit and of guilt, hardly yield an odds to our advantage.

And thus the result of a most ancient history of man essayed by philosophy, is, Contentment with Providence and, on the whole, with the course of human affairs, which does not commence from the good and proceed to the bad, but developes itself gradually from the bad to the better; to which progress, then, every one is summoned by nature herself, to contribute on his part to the utmost of his abilities.

AN
INQUIRY
CONCERNING THE
PERSPICUITY OF THE PRINCIPLES
OF
NATURAL THEOLOGY
AND OF
MORAL.

IN ANSWER TO THE QUESTION WHICH THE
ROYAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES IN BERLIN
PROPOSED IN THE YEAR 1763.

*Verum animo satis haec vestigia parva sagaci
sunt, per quae possis cognoscere caetera tute.*

They who, from a mistaken zeal for the honour of Divine revelation, either deny the existence, or vilify the authority of natural religion, are not aware, that by disallowing the sense of obligation, they undermine the foundation upon which revelation builds its power of commanding the heart.

BLAIR, *On the Power of Conscience.*

I N T R O D U C T I O N.

The proposed question is of such a nature, that, when it is properly answered, the higher philosophy must thereby acquire a determinate form. When the method, according to which the greatest possible certainty in this species of cognition can be attained, is established, and the nature of this conviction well introspected, an immutable precept of method instead of the perpetual inconstancy of the opinions and sects of the schools, must unite the men of reflection in the like endeavours; in the same manner as NEWTON'S method in natural philosophy altered the licentiousness of the physical hypotheses to a sure procedure according to experience and to geometry. But what method shall this treatise itself have, in which is to be shown to metaphysics their true degree of certainty, together with the way, by which one arrives at it. If this propounding be metaphysical, its judgment is just as uncertain as has hitherto been the science, which thereby hopes to acquire firmness and stability, and every thing is lost. My treatise shall therefore be totally composed of sure positions of experience and immediate consequences therefrom drawn.

I will rely neither on the doctrines of philosophers whose insecurity is the very occasion of the present problem, nor on definitions, which are so often fallacious. The method I use shall be simple and cautious. Whatever may be found insecure will be of such a nature, as to be used for the explication only, but not for the proof.

AN
INQUIRY
CONCERNING THE
PERSPICUITY OF THE PRINCIPLES
OF
NATURAL THEOLOGY
AND OF
MORAL.

CONTEMPLATION THE FIRST.

UNIVERSAL COMPARISON OF THE MODE OF
ATTAINING CERTAINTY IN THE MATHEMATI-
CAL COGNITION WITH THAT IN THE
PHILOSOPHICAL.

1.

*The Mathematics attain all their Definitions
synthetically, but Philosophy analytically.*

Every one universal conception may be ar-
rived at in two ways, either by the *arbi-
trable conjunction* of conceptions, or by se-
paration from that cognition, which is made
perspicuous by anatomizing. The mathema-
tics never frame definitions, but in the first
manner.